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The Mind of the Terrorist 
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
JEFF VICTOROFF 
Department of Neurology and Psychiatry 
University of Southern California School of Medicine 
This article reviews the state of the art of available theories and data regarding the psychology of terror- 
ism. Data and theoretical material were gathered from the world's unclassified literature. Multiple theories 
and some demographic data have been published, but very few controlled empirical studies have been con- 
ducted investigating the psychological bases of terrorism. The field is largely characterized by theoretical 
speculation based on subjective interpretation of anecdotal observations. Moreover, most studies and theo- 
ries fail to take into account the great heterogeneity of terrorists. Many practical, conceptual, and psycholog- 
ical barriers have slowed progress in this important field. Nonetheless, even at this early stage of terrorism 
studies, preliminary reports suggest that modifiable social and psychological factors contribute to the gene- 
sis of the terrorist mind-set. Psychological scholarship could possibly mitigate the risk of catastrophic attack 
by initiating the long overdue scientific study of terrorist mentalities. 
Keywords: terrorism; terrorist; psychiatry; psychology; sociology; homeland security 
Terrorism has surely existed since before the dawn of recorded history (Merari and 
Friedland 1985). Human nature has not changed. However, three interlocking trends 
have significantly changed the nature and degree of the threat: the globalization of 
commerce, travel, and information transfer, which puts economic disparities and ideo- 
logical competition in sharp relief and facilitates cooperative aggression by far-flung 
but like-minded conspirators; the ascent of religious fundamentalism as an aggrieved 
competitor with the market-economic, democratic, and secular trends of modernity; 
and the privatization of weapons of mass destruction, putting the potential of macro- 
terrorist acts into the hands of small groups or even individuals (Hoffman 1998; 
Laqueur 1999; Enders and Sandler 2000). September 11, 2001, is one result-and 
probably a warning of events to come (Gunaratna 2002). It perhaps would not be an 
exaggeration to state that these fast-evolving trends together constitute a clear and 
present danger to the security of civilization (Stern 1999). 
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It would seem appropriate for the scholarly disciplines of psychology and psychia- 
try to bring their intellectual resources to bear on the political problem of terrorism, a 
problem that-stripped to the basics-is one of atypical human behavior. Apart from a 
drive for truth, political psychological theory advises that the better a target group 
understands the roots of the terrorist mind-set, the better that group may develop poli- 
cies to effectively manage the risk (Wardlaw 1989; Clayton, Barlow, and Ballif- 
Spanvill 1998). Despite the compelling need for such an understanding, many theoret- 
ical and practical impediments have delayed, and perhaps even derailed, the objective 
scientific psychological study of terrorism (Reich 1998; Horgan 2003). Indeed, the 
following question must be asked: to what degree are leading psychological theories 
of terrorism supported by valid concepts and objective research? A comprehensive 
review of the literature suggests that a lack of systematic scholarly investigation has 
left policy makers to design counterterrorism strategies without the benefit of facts 
regarding the origin of terrorist behavior-or, worse, guided by theoretical presump- 
tions couched as facts. Investigating the terrorist mind may be a necessary first step 
toward actualizing modern political psychology's potential for uncovering the bases 
of terrorist aggression and designing an optimum counterterrorism policy. 
Information for this article was derived from a review of the unclassified literature 
on psychosocial aspects of terrorism, including peer-reviewed articles, books and 
book chapters, news reports, and personal communications with terrorism experts. 
Scholarly articles were identified by a search for the term terrorism in the following 
databases: PsychINFO (1887-2003), Sociological Abstracts (1974-2003), Medline 
(1966-2003), and Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe (1980-2003), as well as from bibli- 
ographies of the identified articles. This article critically reviews published theories of 
the psychological bases of terrorism, reviews the psychosocial data describing terror- 
ists, defines the limits of and impediments to inquiry in this field, and offers a prelimi- 
nary political-psychological classification of terrorism. 
DEFINITION AND DIMENSIONS 
OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR 
Schmid (1983) compiled 109 academic definitions of terrorism, suggesting that 
there are roughly as many available definitions as there are published experts in the 
field. The lack of consensus is to some extent inescapable, given the heterogeneity of 
terrorist behaviors, the variety of declared or assumed motivations, and the question of 
point of view, a.k.a., the "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" prob- 
lem (Jenkins 1982; Hoffman 1998). Nonetheless, two common elements are usually 
found in contemporary definitions: (1) that terrorism involves aggression against non- 
combatants and (2) that the terrorist action in itself is not expected by its perpetrator to 
accomplish a political goal but instead to influence a target audience and change that 
audience's behavior in a way that will serve the interests of the terrorist (Badey 1998; 
Laqueur 1999). 
The typology of terrorism is complex and controversial since actors can be char- 
acterized across multiple variables. Schultz (1980) proposed seven such variables- 
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TABLE 1 
Dimensions of Terrorism 
Classification Variable 
Perpetrator number 
Sponsorship 
Relation to authority 
Locale 
Military status 
Spiritual motivation 
Financial motivation 
Political ideology 
Hierarchical role 
Willingness to die 
Target 
Methodology 
Individual vs. group 
State vs. substate vs. individual 
Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist v . pro-state/pro-establishment 
Intrastate vs. transnational 
Civilian vs. paramilitary or military 
Secular vs. religious 
Idealistic vs. entrepreneurial 
Leftist/socialist vs. rightist/fascist vs. anarchist 
Sponsor vs. leader versus middle management vs. follower 
Suicidal vs. nonsuicidal 
Property (including data) vs. individuals vs. masses of people 
Bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, mass poisoning, 
rape, other (e.g., bioterrorism, cyberterrorism) 
causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization, and participation-that 
might be specified for revolutionary versus subrevolutionary terrorism. Post (2004) 
usefully divided political substate terrorism into (1) social revolutionary terrorism, (2) 
right-wing terrorism, (3) nationalist-separatist terrorism, (4) religious extremist ter- 
rorism, and (5) single-issue (e.g., animal rights) terrorism, proposing that each type 
tends to be associated with its own social-psychological dynamics. A more compre- 
hensive typology is shown in Table 1, listing variables subject to analysis and classi- 
fications within those variables. 
Any such typology must be considered a heuristic compendium of ideal types, and 
classes should not necessarily be construed as dichotomous. For example, while many 
instances of collective violence unequivocally meet the criteria for state terrorism 
(e.g., the gassing of Iraqi civilians in Halabja), the distinction between state and 
substate terrorism can be blurred, as in the case of pro-government paramilitary death 
squads in South Africa or Columbia (Hoffman 1998; Stern 1999). It is an open ques- 
tion whether a particular type of mind is disproportionately associated with a given 
political category of terrorism. Yet another challenge to any psychological inquiry into 
the "mind of the terrorist" is that terrorist groups typically exhibit hierarchical organi- 
zation, with various roles assumed within each level of that hierarchy (see Figure 1). 
Each position on such a matrix may attract individuals with different predispositions 
who perhaps play their roles because of profoundly different psychological factors. 
One might postulate, for example, that some leaders are more likely to be self- 
imagined idealists or altruists, others are driven by messianic delusions, others by eth- 
nic or religious animus, and others by entrepreneurial ambitions-a point that seems 
clear when we intuit, for example, the differences of psychic attributes likely separat- 
ing the three convicted terrorist leaders Shoko Asahara, Abu Nidal, and Nelson 
Mandela. Of course, roles may blur depending on the type of the group and its size. 
Nonetheless, since individuals of different temperaments might play extremely differ- 
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-Sponsor Leader Executive Middle Follower Lone 
Committee Manage Wolf 
ment 
State Self- Political Foot soldier/ 
authority imagined policy Strategist/ action 
figure idealist maker technocrat perpetrator 
Substate Self- Military 
group imagined policy Recruiter Technician 
sponsor messianic maker 
Individual Ethnic or Trainer/ Researcher/ financial religious dispatcher surveyor contributor animus- 
errand runner driven 
Supplier/ 
Entre- armorer Transporter/ 
preneurI harborer 
Sympathizer/ 
fellow 
traveler 
Figure 1: Roles and Types within Terrorist Hierarchies 
NOTE: Most terrorists, depending on the political category and size of organization, belong to groups exhib- 
iting some or all of the hierarchical evels of authority depicted here. The exception is the Lone Wolf (e.g., 
Theodore Kaczynski)-a terrorist acting in isolation. Role or responsibility within each level of authority is 
probably determined in part by self-selection. Levels and roles may blur in application. Note that the pro- 
posed typology of leaders is theoretical and preliminary, a heuristic list of ideal types based on a review of 
multiple sources. The self-imagined idealist leader (e.g., Menachim Begin, Ulrike Meinhof, Nelson 
Mandela, and possibly Usama bin Laden) commits his life to a goal he imagines as a moral necessity, calling 
for a strategic triumph he claims to engineer altruistically. The self-imagined messianic leader (e.g., Adolph 
Hitler, David Koresh, Shoko Asahara, and possibly some Islamic extremist imams) regards himself as a guru 
destined to fulfill a unique place in history in which strategic triumph equates to personal ascendancy. Many 
leaders, especially those promoting violence against all out-group members (e.g., perhaps Yasser Arafat, 
Slobodan Milosevic, various Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) leaders, and possibly Usama bin 
Laden), may be primarily driven by ethnic or religious animus that overrides idealistic or messianic aims. 
The entrepreneurial leader (e.g., Abu Nidal, "Carlos the Jackal," and leaders of the Abu Sayyaf group) may 
justify his actions according to one of the other types but is primarily circumscribed by shallow, materialist 
drives. 
ent parts in a terrorist group, any empirical study claiming to characterize "the 
psychology of terrorists" might be very misleading if it fails to stratify its findings 
according to level and role. 
Most important for a psychological analysis, it seems reasonable that there may be 
heterogeneity in the temperaments, ideologies, thought processes, and cognitive 
Victoroff/ THE MIND OF THE TERRORIST 7 
capacities of terrorists within political categories, hierarchical evels, and roles (Taylor 
and Ryan 1988; Reich 1998). Thus, it is essential to acknowledge from the outset that 
any effort to uncover the "terrorist mind" will more likely result in uncovering a 
spectrum of terrorist minds. 
PSYCHOSOCIAL DATA DESCRIBING TERRORISTS 
Demographic studies from the 1960s and 1970s constructed a profile of the typical 
terrorist as a well-educated single male in his mid-twenties from a middle-class back- 
ground (see Table 2). For instance, in a 1976 study of eighteen groups, average ages of 
members ranged from 23.2 to 31.3. Most identified/convicted terrorists came from 
middle- or upper-middle-class backgrounds, and the majority had some college edu- 
cation (Russell and Miller 1983). These findings are similar to those from a contempo- 
raneous study of 48 Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) members (Clark 1983). Handler 
(1990) investigated the relationship between political orientation and socioeconomic 
factors by tabulating Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interview data on right- 
and left-wing terrorists active in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. He 
reported that women represented a much larger proportion of left- than right-wing ter- 
rorists (46.2 vs. 11.2 percent), college completion was much more common among 
left- than right-wing terrorists (67.6 vs. 19.0 percent), blue-collar occupation was 
more frequent among right- than left-wing terrorists (74.8 vs. 24.3 percent), and there 
was a trend for both left- and right-wing terrorists to achieve low- to medium-income 
levels even if they had college education. Weinberg and Eubank's (1987) data on 451 
Italian women terrorists also reveal a predominance of those in their twenties, 
although the majority were teachers or white-collar workers. In a rare controlled study, 
Ferracuti (1982; Ferracuti and Bruno 1981; see also Post 2004) compared Italian Red 
Brigade terrorists with politically active controls, finding no notable differences in 
family backgrounds. 
The pendulum swung in the 1980s with the relative quiescence of American terror- 
ist groups, the decimation of European revolutionary anarchist-Marxist groups, and 
the rising world profile of radical Islamic terrorists. The typical Palestinian terrorist of 
that later period was age seventeen to twenty-three, came from a large family with an 
impoverished background, and had low educational achievement (Strentz 1988). But 
the pendulum has swung again. Middle Eastern terrorists in the late 1990s and early 
twenty-first century come from a wider demographic range, including university stu- 
dents, professionals, married men in their late forties, and young women (Rees et al. 
2002). For example, the 9/11 pilots included the middle-aged, middle-class urban 
planner Mohammad Atta and the well-to-do Ziad Jarrah, a man from an affluent fam- 
ily who attended Christian schools and enjoyed discos and beer (Carey 2002; Laabs 
and McDermott 2003; Anonymous 2004). The most recent development, the recruit- 
ment of women as suicide bombers, arises at least in part from the fact that the al-Aqsa 
Martyr's Brigade-associated with Yasser Arafat's Fatah-is the first secular group 
fighting for Palestinian independence and therefore permits females to participate 
(Rees et al. 2002; Wilkinson 2002). 
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TABLE 2 
Reported Demographics of Terrorists 
Author(s) and Year Subjects Age Social Class 
Russell and Miller 350 members of eighteen 
(1983) European, Middle Eastern, 
South American, and Japa- 
nese groups, active 1966- 
1976 
Clark (1983) 48 ETA members, active 
1970s 
Weinberg and 451 Italian women terrorists 
Eubank (1987) 
Strentz (1988) U.S. domestic terrorists: 
1960s and 1970s leftist 
groups (n, NA) 
Strentz (1988) 1980s Middle Eastern ter- 
rorists (n, NA) 
Handler (1990) 161 right-wing and 119 left- 
wing terrorists active in 
United States, 1960s-1970s 
Hassan (2001) "Nearly 250" Hamas or 
Islamic Jihad members, 
1996-1999 
Pedahzur, Perliger, 80 Palestinian suicide 
and Weinberg terrorists 
(2003) 
Sageman (2004) 102 Salafi Muslim terrorists 
from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
France, Algeria, Morocco, 
and Indonesia 
23.2-31.3 > 2/3 middle or upper middle class 
24 (avg.) 28 percent lower; 30 percent 
middle 
60 percent Terrorists: 35 percent students, 43 
ages 20-29 percent white-collar workers or 
teachers, and 7 percent "work- 
ers"; fathers of subgroup of 27: 
10 percent blue-collar workers 
and 41 percent upper middle 
class 
Leader. Middle class 
25-40; 
follower, 
20-25 
17-23 "Unskilled and unemployable" 
NA Right wing: 74.8 percent blue- 
collar workers, 18.3 percent 
white-collar workers; left wing: 
24.3 percent blue-collar workers, 
15 percent white-collar workers 
18-38 "Many" middle class 
24.5 (avg.) Mean socioeconomic status 
(SES) = 5.97 (high SES = 1; 
low = 10) 
25.69 (avg. 18 percent upper class, 55 percent 
age of middle class, and 27 percent 
joining) lower class 
NOTE: NA = not available; ETA = Euzkadi ta Askatasuna. 
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(PCPSR) in 2001 among 1,357 adults in the West Bank and Gaza tested the hypothesis 
that poverty or low levels of education influence attitudes regarding political violence 
and found that support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was even more common 
among professionals than among laborers (43.3 vs. 34.6 percent) and more common 
among those with secondary education than among illiterate respondents (39.4 vs. 
32.3 percent) (Krueger and Maleckova 2002). This is consistent with Sageman's 
(2004) finding that 94 of 132 (71 percent) of Muslim terrorists had at least some col- 
lege education, and 57 of 134 (43 percent) were professionals, although his study is 
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biased toward leaders. More important, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) also tested 
how economic status and education compared with actual participation in political 
violence: comparing 129 Hezbollah fighters ages fifteen to thirty-eight who died in 
action between 1982 and 1994 with members of the general Lebanese population of 
the same age range, the poverty rate was similar (28 percent among fighters vs. 33 per- 
cent in the population), but fighters were significantly more likely to have attended 
secondary school (33 vs. 23 percent). These findings are not consistent with theories 
tying political violence to poverty and lack of education (although a critique of this 
conclusion is noted later in the section on sociological theories). 
Psychological data are even sparser than socioeconomic data, although several pro- 
jects reported "typical" psychosocial characteristics of terrorists in the 1970s and 
1980s. On the basis of unstructured interviews, American psychiatrist David Hubbard 
(1971) reported five traits of skyjackers: (1) violent, often alcoholic father; (2) deeply 
religious mother; (3) sexually shy, timid, and passive; (4) younger sisters toward 
whom the terrorist acted protectively; and (5) poor social achievement. On the basis of 
primarily secondhand source material regarding a subsample of 908 right-wing terror- 
ists in Italy, Ferracuti, and Bruno (1981) claimed to have identified nine typical charac- 
teristics: (1) ambivalence toward authority, (2) defective insight, (3) adherence to con- 
vention, (4) emotional detachment from the consequences of their actions, (5) sexual 
role uncertainties, (6) magical thinking, (7) destructiveness, (8) low education, and 
(9) adherence to violent subculture norms and weapons fetishes. It is interesting that 
these lists, compiled a decade apart, overlap in regard to sexual role uncertainties and 
probably low education (if this is a proxy for poor social achievement). Yet apart from 
this superficial overlap, the two studies do not suggest common features of back- 
ground or personality. Neither of these studies used controls or validated psychologi- 
cal instruments. The largest study of this kind was that performed under the auspices of 
the West German Ministry of the Interior; this ambitious 1980-1983 project involved 
semistructured interviews of 227 left-wing terrorists and 23 right-wing extremists 
(Jiger, Schmidtchen, and Siillwold 1981). Certain demographic, life historical, or 
psychological factors were reported with high frequency in this study population: 25 
percent of leftist terrorists had lost one or both parents by age fourteen, 33 percent 
reported severe conflict with parents, and 33 percent had a history of juvenile court 
conviction. This study also claimed to have identified two patterns of personality traits 
common to terrorists: an extroverted, stimulus-seeking, dependent pattern and a hos- 
tile, suspicious, defensive pattern. This German study presents a major challenge to 
some psychology theories of terrorism simply by recognizing heterogeneous psycho- 
logical categories among terrorists. But again, the psychological conclusions were 
impressionistic, and different psychologists on the German team drew different con- 
clusions (Crenshaw 1986). Without the use of valid and reliable behavioral measures 
and without a control group, one cannot conclude that the characteristics identified in 
the American, Italian, or German studies distinguish terrorists from nonterrorists. 
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, attention has shifted to the psychol- 
ogy of Islamic fundamentalist errorism. There is a dearth of published literature de- 
scribing psychological studies of Muslim extremists. Merari and colleagues admin- 
istered a battery of standardized psychological tests, including some measures of 
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cognitive function, to Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian fighters captured infil- 
trating Israel from Lebanon in the late 1980s (Ariel Merari, personal communication, 
2003). Unfortunately, his data have been classified by the Israeli Defense Forces and 
are unavailable for scholarly scrutiny or attempted replication. Post, Sprinzak, and 
Denny (2003) conducted semistructured interviews with thirty-five incarcerated Mid- 
dle Eastern extremists, including twenty-one Islamic religious terrorists from Hamas 
and its armed wing, Izz a-Din al-Qassam, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, as well as 
fourteen secular terrorists from Fatah. Most had a high school education; some had 
additional schooling. (However, the subgroup of suicide bombers among the Palestin- 
ians was described as ages seventeen to twenty-two, "uneducated, unemployed, 
unmarried.") Most came from respected families that supported their activism, with 30 
percent of the families of religious terrorists and 15 percent of the families of secular 
terrorists reporting their own radical involvement. Peer influence was cited as the 
major reason for joining a terrorist group, and joining increased social standing. Mem- 
bership was described as being associated with a fusion of the young adult's individual 
identity with the group's collective identity and goals. Prison experience was claimed 
to strengthen group commitment for most terrorists of both types. Anger and hatred 
without remorse were often expressed, but there was little interest in obtaining weap- 
ons of mass destruction. This project is one of the few to employ a direct psychological 
examination of recently active terrorists. Unfortunately, the method of subject selec- 
tion, the circumstances of the interviews, and the method of interviewing were not 
described in this otherwise impressive report; few specific demographics were re- 
ported, no formal measures of any psychological variables were used, and no controls 
were examined. 
Psychiatrist Marc Sageman (2004) compiled data from public sources on 172 indi- 
viduals he identified as members of a "global Salafi mujahedin," meaning Muslims 
engaged in terrorist acts against the "far enemy" in the service of a new Islamic world 
order. He included expatriate leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), members 
of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Jemaah Islamiyah, the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front, the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), and al 
Qaeda. Sageman excluded terrorists engaged in local jihads, such as Chechnyans, 
Kashmiris, Afghans, and Palestinians. His sample is thus biased toward those involved 
in transnational terrorism and toward the subgroup, mostly leaders, who have come to 
public attention. He identified "some fragment of childhood data" in 61 cases. Only 4 
had histories suggestive of conduct disorder. Only 1 case (Habib Zacarias Moussaoui) 
was suggestive of a childhood trauma. Descriptors of childhood personality were 
found for 69 cases; although loners outnumbered outgoing children, most descriptors 
were neutral or positive. One-quarter of the group had histories of petty crime. De- 
tailed biographies were examined for 10 cases. Sageman claims that he found "no evi- 
dence of pathological narcissism" and "no pattern of paranoid personality disorder" in 
this subgroup, with the exception of possible traits of al Qaeda leader Ayman al- 
Zawahiri. Although Sageman's conclusions seem highly plausible, the author is can- 
did in admitting the limitations of this work: his sample is very small, atypical, and 
uncontrolled, and the author had no formal method for confirming these indirect 
psychiatric impressions. 
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Potentially high-value data were gathered outside the academic research apparatus 
by United Nations (UN) relief worker Nasra Hassan, based on unstructured interviews 
with "nearly 250" members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad conducted in Gaza between 
1996 and 1999. She reports that the suicide bombers ranged in age from eighteen to 
thirty-eight, more than half were refugees, "many" were middle class, 2 were sons of 
millionaires, and none were depressed, although "many" reported that they had been 
beaten or tortured by Israeli forces. Unfortunately, Hassan's lucid and widely cited 
report does not specify the actual number of terrorist subjects, as well as what propor- 
tion of this total subject population were intended suicide bombers, failed suicide 
bombers, or trainers, and offers no specific demographic, socioeconomic, or psycho- 
logical data (Hassan 2001; Atran 2003). (Some of these data will be incorporated into 
a forthcoming book [N. Hassan, personal communication, 2004].) Barber (1999) con- 
ducted the most extensive study of psychological factors possibly associated with 
Islamic political violence. His report is based on data from the Palestinian Family 
Study, a project involving 6,923 ninth-grade students in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Aggressivity and mood were measured with the Child Behavior Checklist 
(Achenbach and Edelbrock 1987), "family values" were measured by one question 
regarding the importance that respondents placed on getting married and having a 
family, and participation in the intifada of 1987-1993 was measured by the yes/no 
response to a single question: "Before the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho, did you ever distribute leaflets, protect someone from Israeli sol- 
diers or police, march or demonstrate against the occupation, and throw stones at 
Israeli soldiers?" A yes answer to this question was positively associated with depres- 
sion, aggression, and family values. Unfortunately, this question does not allow dis- 
crimination between violent and nonviolent political participation, undermining con- 
clusions one might draw from this ambitious study regarding the predictive value of 
psychological factors for Islamic insurgent aggression. 
OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
Attempts to account for the behavior of terrorists fall into two general categories: 
top-down approaches that seek the seeds of terrorism in political, social, economic, or 
even evolutionary circumstances and bottom-up approaches that explore the charac- 
teristics of individuals and groups that turn to terrorism (e.g., Wieviorka 1993, 2004). 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, approaches such as rational 
choice theory and relative deprivation/oppression theory combine these points of 
view, considering interactions between circumstances and actors. While acknowledg- 
ing the importance of top-down analyses and ultimate causes, this article focuses pri- 
marily on bottom-up approaches and proximal causes in substate terrorism. The prin- 
cipal approaches are organized into groups for the sake of clarity. However, it will 
become apparent hat conceptual overlap exists between theories within and between 
groups. It will also become apparent hat a particular fundamental conceptual frame- 
work-such as psychoanalysis-may inform diverse theories and that the same the- 
ory may be championed from different conceptual frameworks. For example, group 
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theory has psychoanalytic and nonpsychoanalytic champions. Theories of terrorism 
also vary in the extent to which they consider psychological differences between ter- 
rorists playing different roles (e.g., leaders vs. followers), whether terrorists are re- 
garded as psychologically homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether subtypes of 
terrorism are associated with subtypes of terrorists. 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL THEORY 
At one end of the spectrum is the popular opinion that terrorists must be insane or 
psychopathic (Hacker 1976; Cooper 1977; Pearce 1977; Taylor 1988). Here a distinc- 
tion must be made: modern Western psychiatry identifies adult behavioral disorders 
according to a multiaxial classification scheme in which Axis I refers to the major clin- 
ical illnesses-those such as schizophrenia or major depression-while Axis II refers 
to personality disorders-such as antisocial personality disorder (APD) (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000). APD is the current term for a pattern of remorseless 
disregard for the rights of others that was called psychopathy up until the mid-1950s 
and sociopathy thereafter. Psychosis refers to a loss of reality testing observed primar- 
ily in a subgroup of Axis I disorders (e.g., schizophrenia) but is not expected in Axis II 
disorders such as APD. Insanity is not a behavioral science term but a legal term that 
usually implies psychosis, although its definition is subject to significant jurisdictional 
variance (Resnick and Noffsinger 2004). Hence, a psychotic or "insane" person is so 
mentally disordered as to not know right from wrong, while a sociopath knows right 
from wrong and chooses wrong for selfish reasons without pangs of conscience. 
In regard to Axis I clinical disorders among terrorists, very little research has been 
done involving comprehensive psychiatric examination, and no properly controlled 
research is found in the open literature. However, the conclusion-at least on the basis 
of uncontrolled empirical psychological studies of left-wing German militants, mem- 
bers of the Algerian Front de Lib6ration Nationale (FLN), members of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and Hezbollah-has been that terrorists do not usu- 
ally exhibit what we refer to as Axis I or even Axis II psychiatric disorders (Crenshaw 
1981; Jager, Schmidtchen, and Stillwold 1981; Heskin 1984; Merari 1998). German 
psychiatrist Wilfred Rasch (1979) examined eleven terrorist suspects, including mem- 
bers of the Baader-Meinhof group, and reported on a Federal Police study of another 
forty persons wanted as terrorists, finding no evidence of mental illness in any respon- 
dent. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003; also see Post and Gold 2002) also found no 
Axis I disorders on psychiatric evaluations of twenty-one secular and fourteen radical 
Islamic Middle Eastern terrorists. As criminologist Franco Ferracuti (1982) suggested 
more than two decades ago, and as has been supported by subsequent reports (Reich 
1998; Silke 1998; Horgan 2003), while terrorist groups are sometimes led by insane 
individuals, and while a few terrorist acts might be attributed to unequivocally insane 
persons, terrorists rarely meet psychiatric criteria for insanity. 
Rather, most of the literature attributing clinical mental disorder to terrorists peaks 
of the remorseless personality type, psychopathy or sociopathy (Taylor 1988). Cooper 
(1977, 1978), for example, states that terrorists, like psychopaths, are ruthless "out- 
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laws" and "outcasts" who adhere to an anomalous scheme of values out of tune with 
that of the rest of society and that there is a "near identity of this fundamental charac- 
teristic in both the psychopath and the terrorist." Pearce (1977) stated that terrorists 
were sociopaths acting antisocially due to "superego lacunae," meaning gaps in self- 
monitoring; he supports his conclusion partly on the basis of tattoos found on one 
terrorist. 
The claim of sociopathy, advanced without evidence from any empirical study, 
raises the important question of whether terrorism is usually antisocial or prosocial 
behavior. It makes a common kind of sense that individuals who harm innocents are 
antisocial. Those who reject and attack their own society, such as the German student 
who joined the 1970s Red Army Faction or the Christian-to-Muslim convert who joins 
a modem radical Islamic cell, stand against their own and might be regarded as anti- 
social. Yet several lines of reasoning tend to discredit the simplistic claim that anti- 
sociality is typical or even common among terrorists. First, extensive evidence sup- 
ports the observation that, far from being outcasts, terrorists are often regarded by their 
in-group as heroic freedom fighters. As Post (2004) points out, nationalist-separatist 
terrorists must be distinguished from revolutionary terrorists in this regard since the 
former are typically regarded as risking their lives for social welfare, while the latter 
attack their society of origin. That is, the Basque student who joins the ETA, the 
Chechen "black widow" who terrorizes a Moscow theater, or the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Ealem (LTTE) suicide bomber all use terrorism to fight on behalf of their in- 
group. The Irishman who joins the PIRA or the Middle Eastern student who joins an 
Islamic radical group, depending on his specific nation and province, may enjoy con- 
siderable popular support and conscientiously serve his society in a prosocial way. 
Ironically, therefore, with respect to in-groups of identity, certain types of terrorism 
often represent prosocial behavior. Second, evidence exists from the quantitative liter- 
ature that the actions of terrorists, even those who fail and die, might benefit their kin 
and social group (Azam forthcoming). Further evidence of the prosociality of some 
terrorists comes from the empirical work of Italian sociologist Donatella della Porta 
(1988): among 1,214 Italian militants, 351 (45.6 percent) enjoyed personal ties with 
eight or more group members before joining a terrorist organization. This raises the 
question of how large one's group of identity must be to consider collaboration pro- 
social, but it at least suggests that recruitment often involves a network of shared social 
values. Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg (2003) examined this issue from the per- 
spective of Durkheim, who distinguished altruistic suicide-suicide in the service of 
society-from egoistic and anomic suicide. Based on the observation that 80 Palestin- 
ian suicide terrorists from 1973 to 2002 exhibited a higher rate of religious education, 
membership in fundamentalist organizations, and repeat terrorist acts compared with 
nonsuicidal terrorists, these authors proposed that they were probably acting from 
altruistic motives. Indeed, this is the essence of the concept of istishad, selfless death 
in the service of Allah (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003; see also Sageman 2004). It is 
obviously conceptually inadequate to judge antisociality from the perspective of 
the targeted out-group, yet it is premature to conclude that most members of ethnic, 
religious, or national-separatist errorist groups exhibit prosociality based on these 
limited reports. Some antisocial individuals perhaps use the moral cover of group 
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affiliation to disguise their aggressive and remorseless drives. However, pending data 
to the contrary, it seems plausible that many terrorists act in a prosocial manner, both 
believing themselves to be serving society and judged by their in-group to be acting in 
its interest. (It is a separate question to ask whether they subjectively adopt the moral 
position that Corrado [1981] labeled "misplaced idealism.") Thus, Ferracuti's (1982) 
formulation regarding the relationship between insanity and terrorism might equally 
apply to the relationship between sociopathy and terrorism: sociopaths may 
sometimes be among the terrorists, but terrorists are not, by virtue of their political 
violence, necessarily sociopaths. Intuitively, one might expect different personality 
traits among antisocial and prosocial terrorists. This speculation requires further 
study. 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
If most terrorists do not meet diagnostic criteria for a major mental illness or for 
sociopathy, must one conclude that they are rational? This raises the question of the 
explanatory power of rational choice theory-the theory that terrorist action derives 
from a conscious, rational, calculated decision to take this particular type of action as 
the optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal (Sandler, Tschirhart, and 
Cauley 1983; Sandler and Lapan 1988; Crenshaw 1992; Wilson 2000). A distinction 
should be made between rational-or strategic-choice theory and other individual or 
group psychological theories of terrorism. The latter try to explain why people are 
inclined toward a type or style of behavior (e.g., to be a terrorist), while rational choice 
theory, derived from economics, assumes this behavioral proclivity as a given and 
attempts to explain how changes in policy-the rules of the "game" that is played 
between terrorists and governments-might predictably alter behavior. Since rational 
choice theory considers both policy and individual behavioral responses to policy, it 
combines the top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Game theory, based on this "assumption of rationality" in strategic choice formula- 
tions, has been used to analyze and predict political behavior since the seminal work of 
Deutsch in the 1950s (Deutsch 1954; Deutsch and Krause 1962; Milburn and Watman 
1981; Machina et al. 1989). Empirical support for game theory comes from experi- 
ments in which volunteers play against rivals in games such as the prisoner's dilemma, 
sometimes to win a payoff such as points, sometimes to avoid costs such as loss of face 
or electric shocks (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Deutsch 1954; Borah 1963; 
Rapoport and Chammah 1968). Sandler and Arce (2003) listed six strengths of mod- 
ern game theory for revealing quantifiable factors theoretically underlying the behav- 
ior of terrorists and targeted governments: game theory (1) captures the interde- 
pendent nature of such interactions, (2) helps discover the strategic implications when 
each side acts according to its best guess about how the other side thinks, (3) incor- 
porates the impact of threats and promises from each side, (4) takes advantage of 
the observation that "players" tend to maximize goals subject to constraints, (5) helps 
predict outcomes in bargaining over demands, and (6) acknowledges the impact of 
uncertainty-incomplete information-on all the above. They cite the example of the 
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shift away from skyjackings to kidnappings after the installation of metal detectors at 
airports in 1973 as evidence of a predictable and rational response to new constraints. 
Political scientist Martha Crenshaw (2000) has cautioned that the ostensible goal of 
terrorists often appears so unlikely to be achieved by the chosen action that it is diffi- 
cult to support an overarching rationalist theory of terrorism. Furthermore, the outra- 
geous inhumanity of attacks on innocent civilians challenges the commonplace under- 
standing of "rational" behavior. Given questions about incoherent motivations, 
ghastly means, and political inefficacy of terrorism, some scholars have proposed that 
the typical terrorist is not simply a "rational actor" in the strict Weberian sense 
(Brannan, Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg 2001). On the other hand, historical evi- 
dence suggests that terrorism is sometimes a practical, low-cost strategy through 
which subordinate groups leverage their power to successfully achieve their ends 
(Sandler and Enders 2004). Indeed, modem history is replete with examples of suc- 
cessful substate political violence: Irgun's bombings were a major factor in securing 
the independence of Eretz Israel from the British; terrorism by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) precipitated accommodations leading to the Irish Free State; Shi'ite Mus- 
lim terrorists provided key assistance in the ouster of the Shah of Iran; Hezbollah's sui- 
cide bombing campaign of 1983-1985 directly led to the American, French, and Israeli 
withdrawal and establishment of a Shi'a-controlled society in major parts of Lebanon; 
and the African National Congress (ANC) used terrorism as part of its remarkably suc- 
cessful strategy to overthrow the apartheid government of South Africa. More re- 
cently, al Qaeda's brutal transnational campaign, including the mass murders at New 
York's World Trade Center in 2001, may have not only rapidly advanced Usama bin 
Laden's stated goal of removing the large U.S. military presence from Saudi Arabia 
but also served as an extremely potent recruiting tool (Laqueur 1987; Hoffman 1998, 
1999; Whittaker 2001). Thus, historical precedents support many terrorists' expecta- 
tions of success, so the theory of strategic choice must not be discounted on the 
grounds that terrorism's goals are uniformly improbable. Game-theoretical ap- 
proaches are also sophisticated enough to recognize that the "winnings" that satisfy 
terrorists may not be their overt antigovernment goals but less obvious goals such as 
martyrdom, which may not only serve as an end in itself but also yield unexpected ben- 
efits to the terrorist's offspring that exceed the "opportunity cost" of an educated life 
lost prematurely (Brooks 2002; Azam forthcoming). Moreover, game theory has 
yielded evidence of counterintuitive but important predictions such as the possibility 
that government investments in deterrence might waste resources or even produce 
paradoxical increases in threats (Sandler and Arce 2003). 
Strategic choice theory potentially offers vital insights into the potential payoff of 
terrorist versus government actions. By uncovering otherwise cryptic benefits, this 
approach may help explain otherwise enigmatic behaviors. Insofar as humans evolved 
to function as sophisticated calculators of risks and benefits, and insofar as groups 
function collectively to actualize the will of their members, one can make quantitative 
predictions regarding the theoretical circumstances under which terrorist behavior 
serves group and individual interests. Such microeconomic analyses may help in 
calculating the likely outcome of different policy options, such as hardening targets, 
calculating concessions, or performing retaliatory strikes (Sandler and Lapan 1988; 
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Lee 1988; Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994; Sandier and Arce 2003; Sandier 
and Enders 2004). But the following question remains: what are the limitations, or 
even potential pitfalls, of the game-theoretical approach? 
Evidence suggests that very few individuals who rationally believe that terrorism 
may advance their cause ever become terrorists (Schbley 2000). This is conceivably 
related to the discovery that 85 percent of World War II infantrymen facing the enemy 
failed to pull the triggers of their weapons, despite the urgent rational benefits 
(Grossman 1995). In other words, even obvious strategic benefits may not compel 
humans to violence, an arguably irrational result of modem culture. And some terror- 
ists (e.g., "lone wolf" terrorist Theodore Kaczinski) commit violence due to unequivo- 
cally irrational motives (in his case, paranoid schizophrenia). Thus, the rare and idio- 
syncratic decision to become a terrorist cannot be explained by rational choice theory. 
Yet it is inappropriate to criticize this theory because it fails to explain why only a tiny 
minority of individuals turns to terrorism; it does not try to. It focuses instead on what 
members of this rare group are likely to do under various conditions. 
Two other criticisms of rational choice theory may be more compelling. First, ratio- 
nal choice theory claims predictive power for future events, extrapolating both from 
laboratory experiments of the behavior of nonterrorists playing nonnaturalistic games 
and from post hoc analysis of real-world incidents. But as Wieviorka (1993, 57) 
observed, this kind of strategic analysis weighs "questions of resources and power 
relationships... as if the principles underlying their actions had been established once 
and for all, and as if the effects of violence were predictable and measurable" (see also 
Wieviorka 2004). The uncertainty of the principles of terrorist-government interaction 
adds to the uncertainty of the facts known by the players since, as the early work in 
game theory illustrates, a slight change in the "rules" may yield opposite behavioral 
results (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Milburn and Watman 1981; Machina 
et al. 1989). Refinements in the understanding of terrorist-government engagements 
based on increasingly sophisticated event analysis and classification should reduce 
this element of uncertainty and strengthen the predictive validity of this approach. 
Second, it may be dangerous to assume that a profile of a "typical player" will pre- 
dict an actual terrorist's responses. As Merari (2002, 4) has said, "In a perfectly ratio- 
nal system, the basic idea of deterrence is to deliver a clear, credible message to the 
opponent that the cost of pursuing a certain course of behavior outweighs its benefits. 
In reality, however, this simple formula rarely, if ever, works according to expecta- 
tions." The most likely explanation for such unanticipated consequences is simply that 
the immense plasticity and individual variability of the human central nervous system 
often generate idiosyncratic and individualistic responses that defy predictions not 
only because of incomplete information held by the actor but also because of im- 
pulsivity, faulty cognition, and emotional processes that overrule adaptive choices. 
Writing the applicable game-theoretical equation becomes ever more challenging as 
imponderable variables are added to accommodate individual emotional peculiarities 
of terrorists, victims, and governments: the lure of bravado and romance of risk, the 
self-destructive urge for "success" in likely failure with or without the utility of mar- 
tyrdom, the Svengali-like influence of charismatic leaders on either side whose fol- 
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lowers march in maladaptive columns, the power of rage to better reason, the blindness 
of ambition, the illogic of spite, or the frenzy of revenge all may contribute to the sto- 
chastic occurrence of surprising scenarios. Moreover, the lack of an empirically vali- 
dated typology of terrorist variants complicates writing optimum theorems for sub- 
types of players who may exhibit very different behavioral proclivities (Bowen et al. 
1985; Friedland and Merari 1985; Merari 2002). Nonetheless, no behavioral theory is 
expected to accommodate all examples; the law of large numbers by itself guarantees 
some failures of prediction. It would be sufficiently valuable if rational choice calcula- 
tions predicted a higher proportion of terrorist behaviors than did nonquantitative 
methods or reliably predicted responses in some subtype of engagements. Merari's 
(2002) strong claim that terrorist behaviors "rarely, if ever" follow such predictions is 
the key question. Further empirical work should be able to resolve that debate. 
I would propose that rational choice analysis is a powerful tool for discovering the- 
oretically valid and surprisingly counterintuitive forces that probably influence terror- 
ist and government behaviors. Game theory may also prove invaluable in predicting 
likely changes in the base rate (the rate predicted in rational actor simulations) of 
behaviors of an idealized terrorist in response to concessions or deterrents. However, 
rational choice theories cannot predict idiosyncratic responses. Policy recommenda- 
tions that predict deterrence of terrorist acts are only as valuable as their capacity to 
anticipate the extraordinary variability and adaptability of humans. 
Moreover, at present, rational choice theory does not explain why a very few indi- 
viduals, among hundreds of thousands in virtually identical political positions, 
become terrorists. As Crozier (1960, 9) suggested, "Men do not necessarily rebel 
merely because their conditions of life are intolerable: it takes a rebel to rebel." Indi- 
vidual factors must be at work. Temperaments vary. Human frontal lobe cortical plan- 
ning based on rational calculation of costs and benefits is forever subject to limbic tyr- 
anny. Passion often trumps rationality, behaviors may deviate significantly from the 
predicted base rate, and understanding the mind of the terrorist-with or without pre- 
diction of future behavior-requires investigations beyond the realm of game theory. 
If neither insanity/sociopathy nor rational choice can fully account for the genesis 
of terrorist behaviors, what alternative psychological explanations seem most plausi- 
ble? As Crenshaw (1986, 386) stated, even though terrorism does not result from a 
specific psychopathological condition, that is not to say that "the political decision to 
join a terrorist organization is not influenced or, in some cases, even determined by 
subconscious or latent psychological motives." In other words, although terrorists 
rarely exhibit psychological disorders, they may exhibit identifiable psychological 
traits or may have been influenced by identifiable social factors. Political scientists, 
sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists have offered diverse opinions regarding 
the degree to which the roots of terrorist aggression are innate versus acquired, the 
product of psychodynamic versus social forces, or the product of individual versus 
group forces. The most frequently cited theories can be divided into sociological theo- 
ries, psychoanalytic approaches to individual psychology, nonpsychoanalytic psycho- 
logical approaches to individual psychology, and theories of group process. 
18 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES 
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 
Bandura's (1973, 1998) social learning theory of aggression suggests that violence 
follows observation and imitation of an aggressive model, and a variant of this theory 
has been invoked to explain terrorist behaviors not as the consequence of innate 
aggressivity but of cognitive "reconstrual" of moral imperatives. Teenagers living in 
hotbeds of political strife may directly witness terrorist behaviors and seek to imitate 
them or, even more commonly, learn from their culture's public glorification of terror- 
ists-for example, the "martyr posters" lining the streets of Shi'a regions of Lebanon 
and Palestinian refugee camps or the songs celebrating the exploits of the PIRA 
(Crenshaw 1992; Taylor and Quayle 1994; Kelly and Rieber 1995). Social learning of 
the acceptability of terrorist violence may also take a didactic form, as in the teaching 
of an extremist form of jihad in many Pakistani and Palestinian madrasas-religious 
schools for young Muslim boys. Madrasas have existed since the time of Muhammad, 
but the recent worldwide resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has led to an increase 
in their numbers and possibly in the violence of their message (Armstrong 2000; Mar- 
shall and Danizewski 2001; Kepel 2002; Atran 2003). Evidence suggests that a minor- 
ity of prominent ransnational Muslim terrorists were educated in madrasas (Sageman 
2004; Anonymous 2004). This, however, does not exclude the possibility that wide- 
spread education of this type influences even nonattendees via cultural diffusion. 
Terrorist didactic learning also occurs via the dissemination of terrorist philosophy 
and methodology in communiquds, audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, and Web 
sites. The most influential historical example may be the widely translated 1969 
"Mini-Manual" or "Handbook of Urban Guerilla Warfare" by Brazilian terrorist 
Carlos Marighella (1971; also see Saper 1988), which, among other practical advice, 
suggests that readers learn to pilot a plane. The charter of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya [Hamas]) represents a more recent 
example; article 15 of this document emphasizes the importance of teaching jihad: 
"We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem 
is a religious one... I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and 
kill, assault and kill, assault and kill" (Alexander 2002, 57). It seems plausible that 
didactic teaching or social learning may influence some young people toward terror- 
ism. However, the social learning/cognitive restructuring model fails to explain why 
only a small minority among the hundreds of thousands of students educated for jihad 
in madrasas, the millions exposed to extremist publications, and the tens of millions 
exposed to public glorification of terrorists have become terrorists. As Taylor and 
Quayle (1994, 32) put it, "Not everyone from those communities, although subject to 
those same or similar influences, becomes a terrorist" (see also Sageman 2004). 
Therefore, while social learning probably helps animate the small minority who turns 
to political violence, this theory fails to explain why these particular individuals be- 
come terrorists. Other factors must be sought. 
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FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS 
This raises the question of how politically motivated people reach the point of no 
return at which their potential energy is converted into violent action. The frustration- 
aggression (FA) hypothesis-one outcome of an interdisciplinary collaboration by 
political and social scientists at Yale University to better understand the violence 
observed in early twentieth-century Europe-has often been cited, attributing the final 
expression of the terrorist impulse to desperation in the face of oppression (Dollard 
et al. 1939; Friedland 1992). Political psychologist John Chowing Davies (1973, 251) 
has even stated, "Violence is always a response to frustration" (emphasis added). The 
FA hypothesis is included here as a sociological theory, although the original intent of 
Dollard et al. (1939) was also to account for individual behavior; thus, terrorist vio- 
lence of either groups or individuals might be explained by this theory. 
However, the application of this theory to terrorism studies has been criticized on 
several grounds: millions of people live in frustrating circumstances but never turn to 
terrorism, many terrorists do not belong to the desperate classes whose frustration they 
claim to be expressing, and terrorism does not uniformly appear to be an act of last 
resort by those who have exhausted alternate approaches (Billig 1976; Merari and 
Friedland 1985; Laqueur 1987; Friedland 1992; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The leftist 
terrorism of 1970s Europe, for example, was primarily perpetrated by members of 
privileged classes, and state-sponsored terrorism can hardly be attributed to the 
oppression of the government by its victims. Frustration, therefore, may plausibly play 
some part in the genesis of some political violence, but the FA hypothesis is not by 
itself sufficient to explain terrorism. 
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY 
It has also been proposed that economic disparities cause terrorism. This claim 
underlies Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation-that rebellions come to be 
when people cannot bear the misery of their lot. As Schmid (1983) observed, Gurr's 
theory derives more from psychoanalysis than from empirical sociology and is con- 
ceptually born of the FA hypothesis. Irrespective of these psychiatric roots, multiple 
writers have claimed a sociological link between poverty and terrorism (Schmid 1983; 
Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). More 
recently, increasing differences between the material welfare of the haves and have- 
nots have been postulated to provoke a new era of political violence that will accelerate 
as globalization not only creates new foci of poverty but facilitates communication 
between those who perceive themselves to be globalization's victims (Maya, Lander, 
and Ungar 2002). One possibility is that either absolute deprivation or relative eco- 
nomic disparity ignites terrorist sentiments, especially among members of an op- 
pressed underclass. 
The major European revolutions of the eighteenth through the early twentieth cen- 
turies were probably provoked, at least in part, by class disparities. From the French to 
the Russian revolutions, have-nots indisputably became major participants in political 
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violence (Zamoyski 1999). On the other hand, as noted above, the left-wing terrorists 
of the 1960s to 1970s were not usually impoverished; indeed, they were sometimes 
accused of belonging to an idle middle class that expropriated the misery of a different 
class to serve their own goals. So, although poverty may play a role in some political 
violence, relative deprivation is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain revolution- 
ary terrorism. Evidence also exists that right-wing extremism occurs independent of 
economic status. Canetti and Pedahzur (2002), for example, reported that right-wing 
extremist sentiments were unrelated to socioeconomic variables among 1,247 Israeli 
university students. 
Krueger and Maleckova's (2002) previously cited important work with Palestin- 
ians does not support a simple poverty-causes-terrorism conclusion. However, their 
analysis is based on socioeconomic background, not on socioeconomic prospects. 
Given the 70 percent adult unemployment rate in Gaza, the gross domestic product of 
less than $1,000 throughout he Palestinian Territories, the severely constrained eco- 
nomic opportunities despite educational achievement due to the unresolved Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, and the cultural importance of the male breadwinner ole, it is pre- 
mature to rule out the possibility that diminished economic prospects have helped pro- 
voke Palestinian terrorism (Bennet 2004). Furthermore, nationalist-separatist and 
many religious fundamentalist errorists tend to enjoy the support of their communi- 
ties. In such cases, terrorism may be a prosocial activity ostensibly undertaken on 
behalf of all classes. If the entire in-group (that of the political actor) faces economic 
disparities relative to an out-group (that of the privileged target), participation in politi- 
cal violence would not be expected to be an economic class phenomenon but a group- 
of-identity phenomenon. Further esearch will be necessary to determine the relation- 
ship between class of origin, economic expectations, individual factors, and terrorism. 
OPPRESSION THEORY 
Multiple authors, from sociologists to revolutionaries, contend that oppression pro- 
vokes political violence (Fanon 1965; Whitaker 1972; Schmid 1983). Particularly in 
the case of nationalist-separatist or ethnic-sectarian terrorism (e.g., ETA, PIRA, 
Hamas), actors often cite the injustice of their treatment by governments that rob them 
of identity, dignity, security, and freedom as the motive for their joining a terrorist 
group (Crenshaw 1986; Taylor and Quayle 1994; Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003). 
Since it is difficult to measure oppression itself-a sociopolitical relationship subject 
to point of view-and since the impact of oppression may be felt subjectively to 
greater or lesser degrees by individuals within a community at risk, perceived oppres- 
sion may be the proper cognitive-emotional variable to examine as a potential risk fac- 
tor for terrorism. There are innumerable scales and instruments for assessing per- 
ceived prejudice and discrimination (e.g., McNeilly et al. 1996; Utsey and Ponterotto 
1996; Neto 2001; Loo et al. 2001; Murry et al. 2001; Duckitt et al. 2002). However, 
virtually all of these are specifically designed to address the experience of a single 
group-in most cases, African Americans. None of them measures the life-and- 
liberty-threatening dominion of one group over another implied by the psycho- 
political concept of oppression. In fact, an extensive review of multiple databases 
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reveals that no general psychological instrument has yet been validated and published 
for the study of perceived oppression. As a result, no persuasive empirical evidence 
is available supporting the much-cited hypothesis that oppression or its perception 
drives the behavior of terrorists. 
Even if perceived oppression could be shown to breed terrorism, it would never be a 
sufficient explanation. As Silke (2003, 33) said so well, "Very few individuals of 
aggrieved minorities go on to become active terrorists. The question has always been, 
why did these particular individuals engage in terrorism when most of their compatri- 
ots did not?" Sociological theories, like rational choice approaches, do not answer this 
question. 
NATIONAL CULTURAL THEORY 
While many differences are observed between cultures, a specific variable was 
claimed to be key by Weinberg and Eubank (1994), who proposed that terrorism 
expresses itself differently in "collectivist" versus "individualist" cultures. According 
to this theory, in collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the 
social system, dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and 
linking their personal well-being to the well-being of their group, while in individual- 
ist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals. Weinberg and Eubank propose 
that collectivists would be more likely than individualists to carry out terrorist attacks 
on out-groups, including foreigners. Individualists would be less inhibited in attacking 
one of their own. The authors used psychological rankings of IBM corporate employ- 
ees in forty nations on a scale of individualism/collectivism, reporting that U.S. citi- 
zens were the most individualistic (score 91), Israelis were in the middle (54), and 
Third World nations tended to be the most collectivist, such as Pakistan at 14 and 
Columbia at 13. Comparing these rankings with reports of terrorist activity from the 
"International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events 1968-1977" (ITERATE) data- 
base (Mickolus 1980), they claim that the data support their prediction that 
collectivists are more likely to attack foreigners, while individualists are more likely to 
attack conationals or members of other individualist cultures. They also claim, without 
data, that individualists feel morally restrained from attacking innocents, while 
collectivists have two moralities-one for the in-group, one for the out-group-and 
would not be morally inhibited from attacking innocents in the out-group. 
This work might be criticized on numerous grounds: the paucity of data that cul- 
tures can be ranked on this collectivist/individualist dimension; the doubt that IBM 
employees are representative of their cultures; the failure to address the possibility 
that, within nations, subcultures exist that vary on the presumed dimension (such that 
terrorists derive from a distinct subculture); the likelihood that, regardless of national 
culture, individualists arise who become terrorists; the likelihood that the ITERATE 
database for that decade captured primarily left-wing revolutionaries who may bear a 
different relationship to their culture of origin than do nationalist/separatists or reli- 
gious radicals; and the fact that no data are offered supporting the theory of differential 
moral inhibition. Nonetheless, setting aside the simplistic concept of "national" cul- 
ture, the concept that differences in group culture, as explored in cultural anthropol- 
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ogy, might influence the expression of terrorism and audience responses to terrorism 
seems worthy of further investigation. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
In contrast to sociological theories that emphasize factors influencing the behavior 
of an entire group, psychological theories of terrorist behavior primarily emphasize 
individual factors. Since the early twentieth century, a fierce controversy has roiled the 
psychiatric community, dividing psychoanalytic approaches to the study of individual 
psychology, primarily derivative of Freudian theory, from nonpsychoanalytic ap- 
proaches (Wallerstein 1995). For the purposes of this review, these approaches are 
considered separately. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORIES OF TERRORISM 
Psychoanalysis is based on the proposition that much of mental life is unconscious, 
that psychological development proceeds in stages based on infantile sexual fantasies, 
and that psychological distress derives from unresolved intrapsychic conflict regard- 
ing those fantasies (Gabbard 2000). The "dynamics" of this theory was literally de- 
rived from nineteenth-century concepts of physics, in which the flow of mental and 
libidinal energy is deterministically expressed, repressed, or discharged. The theory 
has variants, but they share the notions that (1) parenting (as opposed to intrinsic tem- 
perament) determines psychological temperament and health; (2) active, unconscious 
forces exclude unpleasant houghts from the consciousness; and (3) relationships with 
others, "object relations," are controlled by unconscious forces such as projection- 
the theory that one irrationally attributes one's own attitude to others (Wallerstein 
1995; Gabbard 2000). Multiple nonscientific assumptions underlie the "discoveries" 
claimed by psychoanalysts, principally that the early analysts' impressionistic inter- 
pretations of classic cases according to their own dynamic theory constitute evidence 
supporting that theory. 
Psychoanalytic approaches to terrorist behavior may be roughly divided according 
to their emphasis on identity theory, narcissism theory, paranoia theory, and absolutist 
thinking. 
Identity Theory 
It has been proposed that candidates for terrorism are young people lacking self- 
esteem who have strong or even desperate needs to consolidate their identities (Olsson 
1988). On the basis of unstructured (and largely undocumented) interviews with Irish 
and European terrorists, Taylor and Quayle (1994) reported that many became politi- 
cally violent, seeking a sense of purpose and self-worth-"a place in the sun." The 
theory of psychologist Erik Erikson (1959), that adolescents reach a stage of identity 
formation at which ideologies assist in self-definition, was the basis for Bollinger's 
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(1981; also see Crenshaw 1986) psychoanalytic interpretation of his interviews with 
eight members of German terrorist groups: Billinger claimed that overcontrolling 
parents prevented these respondents from developing autonomy, leading to identity 
crises that made violent struggle irresistible. At the extreme, those with identity confu- 
sion are perhaps tormented by a sense of isolation, conceivably engaging in terrorist 
violence as an adaptive response to the pain of anomie (Ferracuti 1982). 
This perspective is consistent with Freud's (1953-1974) speculation that the princi- 
ple of self-determination may be inseparable from the impulse for destruction. This 
view is also reminiscent of the theories of psychiatrist Frantz Fanon (1965), who pos- 
ited that violence against colonial oppression liberates not only the body but also the 
self-identity. Menachem Begin (1977) offered his own confirmation of this mode of 
thinking with his neo-Cartesian aphorism: "We fight, therefore we are." Young people 
turning to political violence in a desperate search for identity may act alone (e.g., per- 
haps Charles Bishop, a fifteen-year-old who flew a small airplane into a bank in early 
2002, leaving a suicide note declaring his allegiance with al Qaeda) (Rosenberg, 
Waddell, and Smalley 2002), yet they may be very eager to join groups-a behavior 
offering an instantaneous grafting of identity. Identity-starved joiners are also hypoth- 
esized to be motivated by a desire to embrace the intimate tutelage of a charismatic 
leader-a form of anaclitic devotion (choosing a love object who resembles a parent). 
To date, no controlled empirical study testing the applicability of this theory to young 
terrorists has been published. 
Narcissism Theory 
John Crayton (1983), Eric Shaw (1986), Richard Pearlstein (1991), and others have 
invoked Kohut's self psychology to explain the sequence that drives young people 
to terrorism. Psychoanalyst Heniz Kohut (1972, 1978; see also Wallerstein 1995; 
Gabbard 2000) developed self psychology as a departure from the classical ego psy- 
chology of Freud. Self psychology emphasizes the needs that an infant has for caring 
responses to develop normally. Failure of maternal empathy leads to damage to the 
self-image-so called narcissistic injury-that arrests development in one of two 
ways: persistent infantile grandiose fantasies or failure to internalize the idealized 
image of the parent. Either problem prevents the development of adult identity and 
morality. Crayton, for example, proposed that political experience, such as the humili- 
ation of subordination, might produce an adult narcissistic injury that might reawaken 
the psychological trait of infantile narcissism. The result might be a pathological exal- 
tation of self (the genesis of the leader), the abandonment of independence to merge 
with the archaic omnipotent figure (the genesis of the follower), or a combination of 
these impulses, as seen in the egotistical yearning for glory under the mask of selfless- 
ness. Both of these forms of infantile retreat are hypothesized to mobilize the expres- 
sion of the desire to destroy the source of the injury (i.e., narcissistic rage). This rage is, 
in essence, rage against the damaged self, projected onto the target of the terrorist's 
animus, as if the target were the source of the intolerable feelings the terrorist has about 
himself (Crayton 1983; Akhtar 1999). According to Risto Fried (1982), the target or 
victim is treated as a "discardable object," which psychoanalyst Richard Pearlstein 
24 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
cited as evidence that terrorism is a "spectacularly vivid example of narcissistic object 
manipulation." 
The theory of terrorist narcissism is consistent with many reports regarding the 
pathologically dependent psychology of cult adherents, but it is perhaps more perti- 
nent that it fits with empirical observations of both Hubbard (1971) and el Sarraj 
(2002) that terrorists, far from being the aggressive psychopaths of public imagina- 
tion, are often timid, emotionally damaged adolescents-those who have suffered ego 
injuries such as parental rejection that delay or prevent full achievement of adult iden- 
tity-who seem to be in search of affiliation and meaning. In this respect, narcissism 
and identity theory overlap. Potential support for the importance of narcissism comes 
from Gustave Morf's (1970) clinical examinations conducted with prisoners held as 
members of the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ). Morf reported that these 
individuals exhibited narcissistic traits, wishing to put themselves at the center of the 
universe, but did not fulfill the criteria for a full-blown narcissistic personality disor- 
der. He further concluded that a "permissive society" was responsible for their narcis- 
sism. However, he used no standardized psychological instruments, reported no statis- 
tical data, and used no control group. Like Sageman's (2004) previously cited exegesis 
of ten terrorist biographies, the conclusions regarding narcissism are impressionistic, 
not empirical. As a result, it remains undetermined whether the prevalence of narcis- 
sistic traits among terrorists exceeds the prevalence in the general population. And 
other authorities have objected that narcissism is unlikely to explain terrorism in even a 
small number of groups (Corrado 1981; Reich 1998). Again, the intuitively plausible 
scenario of identity deficit with narcissistic rage in the developmental path to terrorism 
has yet to be supported by scientific study. 
Paranoia Theory 
George Washington University psychiatrist Jerrold M. Post is unequivocally 
among the principal contributors to political psychological theories of terrorism. Post 
(1998, 2004) offers a comprehensive, psychoanalytically based formulation of terror- 
ist behaviors-one that includes an explanation for the terrorist's capacity for murder: 
echoing Kohut (1972, 1978), he posits that the salient feature of terrorist psychology is 
projection, an infantile defense that assigns intolerable internal feelings to an external 
object when an individual who has grown up with a damaged self-concept idealizes 
the good self and splits out the bad self. This projection is proposed to be the root of 
an adult persistence of the infantile phase that Melanie Klein called the "paranoid- 
schizoid position" (Robins and Post 1997). While not overtly psychotic, the paranoid 
position nonetheless inflames the terrorist with suspicions that justify bloody acts of 
"self-defense" against his victims: "the zeal of the torturer, the alacrity of the killer, 
represents his eagerness to destroy the devalued and disowned part of the self" (Robins 
and Post 1997, 146). Post's paranoia theory offers a developmental model that ex- 
plains not only why only a minority of individuals with political grievances turns to 
terrorism but also why terrorists kill those who do not appear to constitute an imminent 
threat. 
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Post (1998, 2004) bases his theory in part on an interpretation of the findings of the 
German psychological team that interviewed 250 radicals from the 1970s-mostly 
left-wing revolutionaries (Jiger, Schmidtchen, and Stillwold 1981; Billinger 1981). 
Unfortunately, despite the earnest ambitions of that major study, no formal measure- 
ments of paranoia were used, there was little effort to stratify according to hierarchical 
level and role, there were no controls, and extrapolations from this subtype of terrorists 
to other political categories may be inappropriate. It seems plausible, for example, that 
the student radical of the 1970s who adopted a flagrantly antisocial revolutionary ide- 
ology is more likely to have exhibited some kind of psychological atypicality than is 
the typical Palestinian extremist or Sunni Iraqi insurgent who chooses behavior widely 
supported within his community. A scientifically weak but plausible criticism of the 
paranoia theory is provided by Sageman's (2004) finding that nine of ten Muslim ter- 
rorist biographies revealed no evidence of paranoia. Yet the most important criticism 
of such psychoanalytical theories is that it is impossible to test any hypothesis that 
attributes covert adult psychodynamic forces to covert psychosexual processes postu- 
lated to have occurred decades before, in infancy. Paranoia theory, like narcissism the- 
ory, remains an intriguing albeit impressionistic psychoanalytic interpretation that 
might, after controlled research using validated measures of paranoia, someday be 
shown to explain some instances of this very heterogeneous adult behavior. 
Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory 
Harvard psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton is another important contributor. Lifton's 
(2000) major recent contribution is an account of the Aum Shinrikyo cult and other 
apocalyptic groups that envision mass destruction as a path toward replacing the cor- 
rupt world with a pure new social order. Apocalyptic groups typically exhibit absolut- 
ist moral polarization, idealization of a messianic figure, and impaired reality testing, 
imagining vast conspiracies of evil such as a "world shadow government" of Jews. 
Lifton's insights-that absolutist/totalist moral thinking helps motivate terrorism via 
its seductive appeal to young adults with weak identities and that terrorists defend 
themselves from normal emotional responses to violence through denial, psychic 
numbing, or isolation of affect-both fit with psychoanalytic theory. Although neither 
absolutism nor isolation of affect by themselves offers an animus belli or explains the 
specific impulse to harm innocents, it seems plausible to predict that irrational vio- 
lence against the "other" would be precipitated when pathological defenses lead to 
black-and-white thinking about the out-group combined with paranoia about in-group 
annihilation. This is consistent with the proposal of Devine and Rafalko (1982) to the 
effect that, paradoxically, terrorists are often uncompromising moralists who see the 
world in starkly polar terms. 
Lifton's (2000) absolutist approach to terrorism represents a compelling combina- 
tion of psychoanalytic developmental theory with a theory of atypical cognitive style. 
However, the evidence offered to support this theory consists of a subjective, theory- 
driven interpretation of unstructured interviews with a few individuals who may not be 
representative, and the postulated existentialist despair, irrational fantasies of world- 
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wide dominion, and pathologically dependent group behavior of apocalyptic cults led 
by messianic leaders seem to characterize only a small minority of terrorist actions. 
One must still explain the majority. 
The great strengths of psychoanalytic interpretations of terrorism are their 
acknowledgment hat individual developmental factors beginning in early childhood 
probably influence adult behavioral proclivities, their recognition of the enormous 
power of the unconscious to influence conscious thought, and their observation that 
covert psychodynamic forces of groups may subsume individuality. The great weak- 
ness is their lack of falsifiability. Psychoanalysis has been largely abandoned among 
modern psychiatrists precisely because it rejects the scientific method, asking that 
adherents accept its propositions as received wisdom. This is not by any means to 
deny that early childhood, unconscious processes, and group dynamics may be key 
factors in the genesis of terrorism. However, psychoanalytic claims regarding pseudo- 
physical intrapsychic dynamics tied to presumptive stages of sexuality cannot be con- 
firmed according to the modern methods of social and behavioral science. A less ideo- 
logical and more empirical psychodynamic model that nonetheless considers the 
crucial role of the unconscious-tested, for example, via controlled research examin- 
ing whether a stratified subgroup of terrorists exhibit elevated scores on validated 
measures of maternal rejection, self-absorption, or paranoia-might more per- 
suasively demonstrate how developmental and unconscious processes help drive 
terrorism. 
NONPSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORIES OF TERRORISM 
Cognitive Theories 
Cognitive capacity refers to mental functions such as memory, attention, concen- 
tration, language, and the so-called "executive" functions, including the capacity to 
learn and follow rules, to anticipate outcomes, to make sensible inferences, and to per- 
form accurate risk-benefit calculations (Lezak 1995). Many of these mental opera- 
tions are conducted within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the brain, a large neural 
association region that attends to perception of present circumstances, previously 
learned associations, and emotions to calculate and activate adaptive plans. In con- 
trast, the capacity to restrain impulses and comport one's behavior to social expecta- 
tions depends on the ventromedial cortex, a region that sits just behind the eyes 
(Gazzaniga 2000; Mesulam 2000). Cognitive style refers to ways of thinking-that is, 
biases, prejudices, or tendencies to over- or underemphasize factors in decision mak- 
ing. Apart from reports of absolutist thinking, little attention has been paid to the possi- 
bility that terrorists, or subtypes of terrorists, exhibit idiosyncrasies of either cognitive 
capacity or cognitive style. 
Substantial evidence exists that violent behavior is influenced by cognitive capac- 
ity and/or style (Bryant et al. 1984; Kandel et al. 1988; Satterfield 1998; Ernst et al. 
2003). It has also been proposed that cognitive style influences the aggressive behav- 
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ior of political leaders (Satterfield 1998). It is tempting to speculate that variations in 
either the capacity or style of thought might affect the likelihood that an individual 
would sympathize with, join, follow, or lead a terrorist group. It is also plausible that 
knowledge of typical variations in cognitive capacity or style might supplement the 
rational choice approach to help predict otherwise unaccountable behaviors in 
response to contingencies such as interactions with governments. Unfortunately, this 
potentially rich vein of study has hardly been mined. Taylor and Quayle (1994), for 
example, speculated that young people joining terrorist groups make a fundamental 
attribution error, a cognitive bias inaccurately attributing devious and evil motives to 
those they perceive as oppressors. However, they offer no data supporting this reason- 
able-sounding claim and no solution to this potential problem, a cognitive factor that 
might account for certain complications of conflict resolution. While some classified 
data exist regarding cognitive capacities of young terrorists (e.g., Merari 1998, 2002), 
the open literature does not report neuropsychological findings meaningfully com- 
paring terrorists or ex-terrorists with matched nonterrorists. 
Sidanius (1985) conducted one study of potential importance to the question of 
cognitive style among terrorists: to examine cognitive factors in different types of 
extremism, he measured conservatism, cognitive flexibility, cognitive complexity, and 
intolerance of ambiguity using normed and validated instruments, including the 
Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Budner 1962), in a randomly selected sample 
of 195 Swedish high school students. Respondents were classified as extreme leftists, 
moderate leftists, moderate, moderate rightists, or extreme rightists. Contrary to theo- 
ries claiming that extremism is associated with cognitive limitations, extreme leftists 
and moderate rightists had the highest cognitive complexity; moderates had the low- 
est. Consistent with some assumptions regarding the rigidity of right-wing values, less 
cognitive flexibility was associated with more sexual repression and greater general 
conservatism. Perhaps most useful for the analysis of terrorism, reduced cognitive 
flexibility was associated not only with intolerance of ambiguity, especially the need 
for certainty and uniformity, but also with racism and ethnocentrism. Thus, it seems 
worth exploring whether those who become ethnic terrorists, driven by a black-and- 
white animus that does not accept the possibility of valued characteristics among 
members of the out-group, are more likely to exhibit the trait of cognitive inflexibility. 
These findings perhaps mesh with those of Canetti and Pedahzur (2002), who reported 
that right-wing extremism among Israelis is associated with authoritarian attitudes, 
xenophobia, and supernatural beliefs. 
Much further work would be needed to determine whether cognitive factors such as 
inflexibility might conceivably represent a general trait of terrorists, a predictable trait 
of a political subgroup of terrorists, or a trait of leaders that might be identified by anal- 
ysis at a distance. Findings in this area may conceivably have strategic importance. For 
example, terrorists with diminished executive function will fail to anticipate future 
consequences. As a result, their responses to negotiation or threat may be less predict- 
able. Those with excessive intolerance of ambiguity or cognitive inflexibility may be 
less adaptable, unable to appreciate nuance, and more irrational in bargaining. Politi- 
cal psychologists could potentially capitalize on these factors to help refine security 
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plans, identifying behavioral markers that distinguish terrorists who are more or less 
likely to follow projected paths. 
Novelty-Seeking Theory 
Some psychological theories attribute terrorism to specific innate aspects of tem- 
perament. For example, developmental theories might predict that youngsters with 
aggressive temperaments would be disproportionately attracted to terrorist organiza- 
tions (Pettit 1997). However, no published research supports this intuitively plausible 
supposition. In fact, a semistructured psychological analysis of 227 left-wing German 
militants found no common pattern of aggressivity (Jager, Schmidtchen, and Sillwold 
1981). Another possibility is that terrorism is associated with the trait of novelty seek- 
ing. Terrorist planning and execution is indisputably thrilling action outside the realm 
of ordinary experience, and many theorists have opined that political violence may sat- 
isfy innate, perhaps genetically determined needs for high-level stimulation, risk, and 
catharsis (Hacker 1983; Kellen 1979; Levine 1999). Possibly consistent with this pro- 
posal, many incarcerated terrorists have expressed their pleasure and excitement at 
being involved in such thrilling action (Juergensmeyer 2000). Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitshak Shamir, who spent his early adulthood with the terrorist organization Irgun, 
conceivably hinted at the same when he said, "That period in the underground was the 
best part of my life" (Marton 1996, 53). The "romance of risk" may explain the special 
affinity of teenagers for such behavior: adolescent anxieties, sexual frustration, and 
developmental attraction to risk taking may play a role in a dangerous flirtation with 
political violence (Ponton 1997; Levine 1999). 
This thesis raises two issues: first, sensation and novelty seeking, a normative fea- 
ture of adolescent development probably tied to expected changes in neural activity 
(Dahl 2004), may play a role in the natural history of terrorist involvement. Second, 
the personality trait of novelty seeking-a measurable, nonnormative, and probably 
genetically influenced characteristic that persists in certain individuals well into adult- 
hood (Zuckerman 2002)-possibly distinguishes those who are more likely to be ter- 
rorism prone. With regard to the first point, evidence suggests that the typical develop- 
ment of terrorist sympathies perhaps follows an arc: young adolescents are plastic in 
their political orientation and open to indoctrination. Positions harden in later adoles- 
cence such that, as Saper (1988, 26) put it, "once belief systems, resentments, and des- 
perate response tendencies are rigidly instilled . . . they are virtually impossible to 
modify belatedly." At the far end of the arc, reduction in destructiveness may occur 
with maturity: interviews with many "retired" terrorists have revealed a mellowing of 
attitude consistent with the theory that enthusiasm for terrorist action is primarily a 
developmental phenomenon of late adolescence and early adulthood (Laqueur 1987; 
Levine 1999; Akhtar 1999). So the normative developmental form of novelty seeking 
probably does contribute to terrorism. With regard to the second point, no studies have 
yet been reported assessing the association between terrorists and adult-persistent 
nonnormative traits of risk taking or novelty seeking. While it seems plausible that 
individuals exhibiting such traits are disproportionately represented among terrorists, 
Victoroff/ THE MIND OF THE TERRORIST 29 
pending supportive evidence, it is premature to conclude that this atypical personality 
feature helps drive terrorism. 
Humiliation-Revenge Theory 
Humiliation-and the consequent internal pressure for revenge-is another psy- 
chological factor that has been hypothesized to drive terrorist violence 
(Juergensmeyer 2000). Revenge for humiliation by an oppressor is, in fact, an ancient 
cultural tradition with direct links to the current violence in the Middle East. The 
oppression of the early Christians, embodied in the image of Christ on the cross, was 
part of the inspiration for the apocalyptic movement in Christianity that culminated in 
the First Crusade (Armstrong 2001). A cycle of oppression and humiliation, followed 
by violent action in the name of liberation, characterizes the subsequent history of the 
Middle East. Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad el Sarraj (2002) has specifically observed 
that humiliation is an important factor motivating young suicide bombers. Dr. Abdul 
Aziz Rantisi, the late political leader of Hamas, confirmed this notion in a statement 
published three years before his death via targeted killing by the Israeli Defense 
Forces: "To die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" 
(Juergensmeyer 2000, 187). Several other authorities also propose that humiliation, 
either by parents in early childhood or by political oppressors later in life, can provoke 
terrorism, but no quantitative research has yet explored this hypothesis (Crayton 1983; 
Volkan 1997; Stern 2003). Whether considered from the psychoanalytic point of view 
as an inevitable dynamic consequence of narcissistic injury or from the nonpsycho- 
analytic point of view as a painful social stressor, humiliation seems plausible as the 
root of an urge to retaliate against political entities that are perceived to be responsible. 
The concept that feelings of humiliation or being taken advantage of gives rise to a 
passion for revenge is very familiar in forensic psychiatry and criminology and proba- 
bly contributes to many nonpolitical murders (Miller 1993; Brooks, Thomas, and 
Droppleman 1996; Schlesinger 2000; Meloy 2001). Note that revenge, in itself, 
should not be regarded as antisocial behavior but as a normal and potentially useful 
activity. Jurisprudence formalizes this feature of social contracts, emphasizing retri- 
bution in part as deterrence, and polities have used vengeance for misdeeds to maintain 
their integrity at least since the Trojan War. Indeed, revenge is an emotion that is proba- 
bly deeply rooted in the adaptive instinct to punish transgressors who violate the con- 
tracts of social species; hence, it is a motivator that often serves not only the goals of a 
vengeful individual but also the goals of his group (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). 
In this sense, revenge is often prosocial and sometimes-if the vengeance taker (e.g., 
Achilles or suicide bombers) stands to suffer and his group to gain-even altruistic. In 
a recent study combining psychological with functional neuroimaging studies in 
humans, de Quervain et al. (2004) showed that individuals punish social transgressors 
even when it is quite costly to the punisher, and they reported evidence that this altruis- 
tic behavior was driven by deep subcortical brain activity that may have overruled the 
more rational cortex. Knutson (2004) highlights the self-defeating and emotionally 
driven nature of vengeance demonstrated by this study, stating that these findings 
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"chip yet another sliver from the rational model of economic man." While this sci- 
ence intriguingly helps to explain how revenge might motivate terrorists and perhaps 
governments to commit murderous behaviors without likely strategic benefits, no 
questionnaire data or measurements of subjective humiliation, desire for revenge, or 
emotional satisfaction after retribution in terrorists or ex-terrorists have yet been pub- 
lished. This plausible theory awaits better substantiation. 
THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESS 
Most published psychological theories explain terrorism as the product of group 
psychology within idiosyncratic subcultures that coalesce in reaction to circumstances 
they perceive as intolerable (Taylor and Ryan 1988; Friedland 1992; Hoffman 1998; 
Merari 1998; Levine 1999; Post 2004; Sageman 2004). Membership in a terrorist 
organization offers disciples a heady liquor of a well-defined personal role, a righteous 
purpose, the opportunity for revenge for perceived humiliations, and the lifting of con- 
straints on the expression of otherwise prohibited behaviors-freeing the member 
from personal responsibility for attacks on out-groups (Hacker 1983; Taylor and Ryan 
1988; Weinberg and Eubank 1994; Stern 1999). Group forces, including ideological 
indoctrination, repetitive training, and peer pressures, have been hypothesized to 
influence the group's violence, whether or not individual members were predisposed 
to such behavior (Crenshaw 1992; Clayton, Barlow, and Ballif-Spanvill 1998). This 
may occur because collective identity subsumes individual identity. As Post, Sprinzak, 
and Denny (2003, 176) put it, "An overarching sense of the collective consumes the 
individual. This fusion with the group seems to provide the necessary justification for 
their actions with an attendant loss of felt responsibility." This description of the sub- 
mersion of individuality is very reminiscent of Eric Hoffer's (1951, 128) statement 
that people who plunge into mass movements "are fashioned into incomplete and 
dependent human beings even when they have within themselves the making of self- 
sufficient entities." Withdrawal from the mainstream may increase the potency of col- 
lective thought: based on a semiquantitative review of life histories of more than 1,500 
Italian and German militants, greater isolation is associated with greater separation 
from social reality (della Porta 1992). 
The principal debate among those discussing group versus individual factors in 
political violence centers on whether group dynamics are sufficient in and of them- 
selves to turn an average person into a terrorist or whether individual history and per- 
sonality must be considered as well. Sageman, one strong proponent of the group 
hypothesis, goes so far as to say that "it's a group phenomenon. To search for individ- 
ual characteristics . . . will lead you to a dead end" (Rotella 2004, A3). However, 
Sageman's psychiatric assessments of Islamic mujahedin were exclusively based on 
secondary sources that did not include any objective behavioral data, so his conclusion 
seems premature. Rasch (1979, 82) observed that the dynamics of living in a terrorist 
group tends to alienate one from others but that "the starting point and personal needs 
existing at the time of entry into the terrorist group are very different for the different 
terrorists." This claim of initial psychological heterogeneity followed by group- 
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induced homogenization appears sensible, but it requires empirical verification. Con- 
sistent with this theory, Friedland (1992) postulated that terrorism is not purely a group 
phenomenon but is obviously the result of an interaction between social processes and 
individual dispositions. However, he proposes three conditions under which indi- 
vidual proclivity to violence is a relatively minor factor in the group's terrorist urning: 
(1) deprivation is intense, (2) the group has ideologized its discontent, and (3) the 
group is cohesive and clearly differentiated from the out-group. He gives the example 
of the Palestinians, whose special circumstances drive individuals with no special pro- 
pensity to violence to undertake terrorist acts. This formulation seems plausible on its 
surface. However, one still must account for the fact that, while most Palestinians sup- 
port suicide bombing, a very small minority does it. Furthermore, no published studies 
support the proposition that these three conditions increase group dynamic success in 
driving nonviolent persons to political violence. Unless and until systematic research 
is conducted making in-depth psychological comparisons between terrorists and 
matched controls from identical political circumstances and estimating premem- 
bership and postmembership willingness to harm innocents, one cannot meaningfully 
quantify the relative influence of individual and group factors. 
LIMITS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 
Psychiatrist Walter Reich (1998, 262) has warned that "psychological accounts of 
terrorism are replete with explanations that ignore or blur the variety and complex- 
ity... a product of loose and weak thinking, a disregard for the need for evidence, and 
the habit, unfortunately endemic in so many areas of psychological discourse, of hav- 
ing a single idea and applying it to everything." Reich's strong caveat against 
overgeneralization and reductionism is a vital counter to the potpourri of psychologi- 
cal theories promulgated by terrorism scholars. In this, he supports Corrado's (1981) 
critical review of the mental disorders approach to political terrorism; Corrado states 
that a terrorist personality probably does not exist and that efforts to psychopatholo- 
gize this type of aggression are rooted in biased theory, not in unbiased data. 
Caveats against overgeneralization and unwarranted medicalization of terrorist 
behaviors are logical and important. Yet it seems reasonable to seek a middle ground 
between the reductionist position that proposes a single psychology of terrorism and 
the nihilist position that denies any explicit psychology of terrorism. That is, until a 
rigorous effort is made to investigate the null hypothesis via the collection of empirical 
evidence, it is premature to conclude that there are no distinguishing psychological 
characteristics among the tiny minority of individuals who are willing to send a terrify- 
ing political message to a target audience by attacking innocent noncombatants. 
Why has the behavioral science community so far failed to amass a persuasive body 
of evidence in this domain? Multiple practical and theoretical impediments have 
delayed the scientific psychological study of terrorism. Most of the practical barriers 
are obvious. For example, terrorism research may involve expensive and inconvenient 
travel to politically unstable regions, is potentially dangerous, and raises ethical issues 
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that may challenge institutional review boards (e.g., Wieviorka 1995; Brannan, 
Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg 2001). These issues may explain why journalists, 
rather than academics, have published a substantial proportion of the available litera- 
ture reporting behavioral observations of terrorists. Active terrorists may have little 
motivation to cooperate with behavioral assessment, and inactive terrorists may no 
longer exhibit the psychology of interest (Reich 1998). Language barriers-including 
the lack of expert translations of high-quality psychological instruments-frustrate 
collection of data. Authorities may deny scholars access to incarcerated terrorists 
because of security concerns and the perception that such assessments are not per- 
tinent to counterterrorism. 
A theoretical issue that seriously limits the utility of interviews with specific terror- 
ists or groups is the fact that, contrary to some published hypotheses, terrorism is not a 
unitary behavior (Crenshaw 1986; Laqueur 1987; Haroun 1999). As a result, theories 
that attempt to generalize and reduce the psychology of terrorism begin with a premise 
that is inconsistent with the available observations, and studies based on such theories 
will produce results with limited predictive value since they conflate data from mixed 
populations. Classifying terrorism according to probable homogeneous psychological 
subtypes that are "at least descriptive, inclusive, discrete, endowed with forecasting or 
prognostic value, policy-generating, possibly etiological, and theoretically 
grounded," as advised by Ferracuti (1982, 132), may be an indispensable preliminary 
step to designing research projects and interpreting data (Wilson 2000). Moreover, as 
Crenshaw (1986, 384-85) urged, "the analysis of terrorism deals with the intersection 
of psychological predispositions (which may be derived as much from prior experi- 
ence and socialization as from psychological traits emerging from early childhood and 
infancy) and the external environment." A complete understanding of the psychology 
of terrorism, therefore, will require the difficult investigation of the dynamics of that 
intersection, in concert with an understanding of the forces of group dynamics and a 
quantitative analyses of events, a challenge demanding an interdisciplinary 
perspective beyond the borders of parochial regimes. 
Funding has long been a problem, with limited federal support (Jenkins 1983). In 
2004, the U.S. Homeland Security Department (DHS) published a Broad Agency 
Announcement soliciting proposals for a university-based Homeland Security Center 
for Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, to be funded at 
$4 million per year for three years (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004). On 
one hand, this is a historic first, the largest grant ever offered to support research on this 
vital issue. On the other hand, the amount involved represents a very small proportion 
of the DHS research budget of more than $500 million per year (Brumfiel 2003) and a 
paltry part of the U.S. defense budget. The announcement emphasizes modeling "to 
detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorist activity at the earliest possible 
point in time" (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004, 8). The above review 
suggests that that "earliest point in time" may occur decades prior to the formation of a 
terrorist group or the planning of an attack and may relate to a combustible conver- 
gence of historical, political, and psychosocial factors. Psychological research may 
contribute most to long-term national security by an open-minded exploration of the 
deep roots of terrorism, with a time horizon that extends far beyond imminent threats 
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and a conceptual horizon that extends beyond the traditional mission of intelligence 
services. 
But the most important barriers to scientific research on terrorism may have deeper 
origins. 
Terrorism, like a shark attack, wields tremendous psychological impact. It is rare 
but awesome, deriving almost mystical significance by virtue of the suddenness, 
drama, and outrageousness of its violence (Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Mahmood 
2001). But terrorists are not bogeymen, and both behavioral scientists and the 
counterterrorism community must be wary of explaining the terrorist mind-set by pro- 
jecting the state of mind required to act in this way. "Terrorists," writes psychoanalyst 
Lloyd DeMause (1986, 419), are "containers into which one can project one's uncon- 
scious hostility." While this statement again presumes a difficult-to-test psycho- 
dynamic theory, it is legitimate to propose that subjectivity confounds the design and 
the interpretation of terrorism studies. That is, in both the scholarly and counter- 
terrorism realms, one must acknowledge the possibility that terrorism excites passions 
that erode logical discourse, leading to responses that are reactive and enraged rather 
than proactive and analytical (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). Just as the terrorist adopts 
absolutist thinking to justify his indefensibly immoral actions, the horrific threat of 
terrorism may perhaps provoke absolutist thinking about terrorists among some 
observers and may conceivably lead threatened groups not only to discount the value 
of objective study and prejudge or misinterpret he available data but also to rationalize 
extralegal steps and the curtailment of civil rights in the name of a war on terrorism 
(Pettit 1997). In his World War I-era essay, "Thoughts for the Times on War and 
Death," Freud (1953-1974) admonished that nation-states sometimes "make use of 
their interests to rationalize their passions." This hypothesis itself could be the subject 
of study. 
A cultural divide also separates behavioral scientists from law enforcement, intelli- 
gence, and military personnel: counterterrorism forces occupy an adversarial position 
and must steel themselves against any sympathetic consideration of the terrorist's 
position. Behavioral scientists, no matter how much they despise terrorist actions, 
must steel themselves to adopt the position of unbiased observers and interpreters of 
behavior (Soskis 1983). While behavioral scientists may recognize marked psycho- 
logical heterogeneity and even prosocial features of terrorists that might be exploited 
in the development of policy, counterterrorism forces and even policy makers may 
resist such conclusions due to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error. 
This divide unfortunately may undercut the effectiveness of counterterrorism by iso- 
lating practitioners from theorists-a separation akin to isolating engineers from the 
discoveries of physicists. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
The leading psychological theories of terrorism include a broad spectrum of socio- 
logical, psychological, and psychiatric approaches. Strikingly, virtually none of them 
has been tested in a systematic way. They are overwhelmingly subjective, speculative, 
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TABLE 3 
Psychological Variables Potentially Identifying Terrorist Subtypes 
Variable Classification 
Reality testing 
Sociality 
Temperament 
Cognitive capacity 
Cognitive style 
Dominance 
Nonpsychotic vs. psychotic 
Prosocial vs. antisocial 
Typical vs. atypical for culture 
Atypically aggressive/hostile 
Novelty seeking 
Identity seeking 
Affectively atypical (depression, irritability, anxiety) 
Vulnerable to charismatic influence 
Sensitive to perception of oppression 
Sensitive to humiliation 
Vengeful 
Self-destructive 
Normal vs. impaired 
Executive function impairment 
Impulse control impairment 
Typical vs. atypical for culture 
Intolerance of ambiguity 
Low vs. high complexity 
Leader vs. follower 
and, in many cases, derived from 1920s-era psychoanalytic hypotheses that are not 
amenable to testing. Students of terrorism might justifiably conclude from the peer- 
reviewed literature that the total number of published theories exceeds the number of 
empirical studies-an imbalance that may be of more than academic import. Even the 
small amount of psychological research is largely flawed, rarely having been based on 
scientific methods using normed and validated measures of psychological status, com- 
paring direct examination of individuals with appropriate controls, and testing hypoth- 
eses with accepted statistical methods. Insofar as policy makers rely on published 
analyses of the "the mind of the terrorist," policies intended to reduce the risk of terror- 
ism may be based on invalid premises. The best solution is hypothesis-based research 
and evidence-based policies. Toward that end, I offer several preliminary conclusions 
and proposals: 
1. Terrorist behavior is probably always determined by a combination of innate factors, 
biological factors, early developmental factors, cognitive factors, temperament, envi- 
ronmental influences, and group dynamics (see Table 3). The degree to which each of 
these factors contributes to a given event probably varies between individual terrorists, 
between individual groups, and between types of groups. Theories that claim the pre- 
dominance of one of these influences over the others are premature since no studies have 
systematically examined more than one or two of these factors, let alone empirically 
examined one while controlling for the others. In particular, the much-cited claim that 
no individual factors identify those at risk for becoming terrorists i based on completely 
inadequate research. 
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A new model is needed, one that accommodates the multiplicity of forces at work to 
arrive at plausible and testable consilience-that is, a unified theory that is explanatory 
across levels of analysis and examples of terrorist activity. One possibility is a neuro- 
economic model that acknowledges the ultimate adaptive nature of this behavior, modi- 
fied by an empirically based psychology identifying the influence of individual and 
group dynamics. Terrorism is unequivocally a multiply and variably determined subtype 
of human aggression. Recognizing this fact may be the first step toward the extremely 
challenging job of designing research, conducting research, and interpreting data. 
2. Terrorists are psychologically extremely heterogeneous. Whatever his stated goals and 
group of identity, every terrorist, like every person, is motivated by his own complex of 
psychosocial experiences and traits. Plausible psychological variables and classes of 
behavior are summarized in Table 3. 
3. Terrorists exhibiting different psychological subtypes probably conform to different 
behavioral proclivities. It is plausible but yet to be proven that different types of terror- 
ism disproportionately attract individuals with specific temperaments. Future research 
should attempt to determine the most likely psychological types among terrorists in 
groups with different political orientations, as well as the relationship between psycho- 
logical types, individual roles in the group, and typical responses to constraints. For 
example, the psychology, morality, and response to bargaining among terrorists who are 
primarily prosocial in their orientation may prove to be dramatically different from that 
of antisocial terrorists. Leaders and followers tend to be psychologically distinct. Be- 
cause leadership tends to require at least moderate cognitive capacity, assumptions of 
rationality possibly apply better to leaders than to followers. Those with diminished 
executive function may be less predictable. Those with subnormal cognitive flexibility 
may be less adaptable and more irrational in bargaining. Those with atypical tempera- 
ments-who are driven by an excessive need for self-affirmation, hatred, vengefulness, 
or self-destructiveness-may behave more erratically. Improved modeling of markers 
of psychological subtypes may enhance the prediction of terrorist behaviors. 
4. Accepting that terrorists are heterogeneous, four traits may possibly be characteristics of 
"typical" terrorists who lead or follow in substate groups: 
a. High affective valence regarding an ideological issue 
b. A personal stake-such as strongly perceived oppression, humiliation, or persecu- 
tion; an extraordinary need for identity, glory, or vengeance; or a drive for expression 
of intrinsic aggressivity-that distinguishes him or her from the vast majority of 
those who fulfill characteristic a 
c. Low cognitive flexibility, low tolerance for ambiguity, and elevated tendency toward 
attribution error 
d. A capacity to suppress both instinctive and learned moral constraints against harm- 
ing innocents, whether due to intrinsic or acquired factors, individual or group 
forces-probably influenced by a, b, and c 
These four characteristics eem plausible based on the above summary of research. They 
are testable hypotheses proposed for further study. 
5. It seems plausible that the culture of origin differentiates, to some degree, expected indi- 
vidual and group dynamics. However, group theory would predict that the internal 
psychodynamics of a terrorist group is influenced as much by the specific personality of 
its leader and the temperaments of its followers as according to any systematic differ- 
ence according to politically types (e.g., nationalist/separatist vs. religious). 
6. The current hrust of strategic choice studies focuses on predicting the behavior of com- 
mitted terrorists. For the purposes of long-term security policy formulation, an increased 
emphasis should be placed on early prevention, that is, on the analysis of the interaction 
between those psychological, cultural, economic, and political factors that influence 
uncommitted but impressionable young people to turn toward terrorism. 
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7. A balance must be achieved between the benefits of secrecy and the urgent need to 
advance knowledge in this field. Restricted access to data will slow scholarly progress 
with unknown consequences to national and international security. A review of the ulti- 
mate impact of this issue at the highest levels of security policy may be required to opti- 
mize this balance and overcome potentially counterproductive barriers. 
8. Scholars must be willing to attempt research that brings them into direct contact with 
active terrorists, recently active terrorists, or those at risk for becoming terrorists. Non- 
coercive recruitment, voluntary participation, and informed consent are essential. 
9. A major investment is required to advance the field of the behavioral and social aspects 
of terrorism. Meaningful research is likely to be interdisciplinary, empirical, controlled, 
ethical, conducted across levels of analysis, and directed at root causes and modifiable 
risk factors along the entire chain of causality from historical forces to childhood influ- 
ences to the moment of a terrorist act. Since the best experts in any discipline are inevita- 
bly scattered geographically, rather than depending on a single center of excellence, 
funding commensurate with the magnitude of the threat should be available on a com- 
petitive basis to serious scholars wherever they work through independent science sup- 
porters such as the National Science Foundation or the Department of Defense. 
The problem is to ask questions the answers to which are most likely to make a dif- 
ference for security, to prioritize research within the remarkable spectrum of possible 
investigations, and to develop practical projects. For example, is the carrot of per- 
ceived concern for victims of disenfranchisement or the stick of high-altitude bomb- 
ing a better investment in reducing the psychological forces nurturing the next genera- 
tion of potential terrorists? What observable behavioral traits distinguish terrorist 
groups or leaders who would be likely to back away from aggression if their griev- 
ances were addressed by negotiation, as opposed to traits distinguishing groups that 
can only be deterred by force? Is the social influence of fundamentalist madrasas asso- 
ciated with a measurable increase in the likelihood of adult terrorist behavior? If so, 
could support for alternative, culturally valued education help impressionable young 
people find more productive foci for their high emotional energy? Do economic pros- 
pects and a sense of personal hope reduce the lure of terrorism? If so, what socioeco- 
nomic or psychological factors modify that association, and what cost-benefit formula 
is applicable? Do psychological traits of leaders of target nations drive policies that 
mitigate or exacerbate the threat? Answers to these and similar questions may be part 
of the key to avoiding catastrophic violence in the twenty-first century. 
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